The first track-back (reversal) I did was on some Japanese hackers who staged out of South America. Here's an excerpt from the log of the server they attacked:
200.165.33.242 - - [18/Jun/2006:19:16:50 -0500] "GET /cgi-bin/ikonboard.cgi HTTP/1.1" 200 51
200.165.33.242 - - [18/Jun/2006:20:32:28 -0500] "GET /cgi-bin/ikonboard.cgi HTTP/1.1" 200 62
200.165.33.242 - - [18/Jun/2006:20:32:34 -0500] "GET /cgi-bin/ikonboard.cgi HTTP/1.1" 200 6568
200.165.33.242 - - [18/Jun/2006:20:33:04 -0500] "GET /cgi-bin/ikonboard.cgi HTTP/1.1" 200 34
200.165.33.242 - - [18/Jun/2006:20:33:08 -0500] "GET /cgi-bin/ikonboard.cgi HTTP/1.1" 200 6564
200.165.33.242 - - [18/Jun/2006:20:33:14 -0500] "GET /cgi-bin/ikonboard.cgi HTTP/1.1" 200 34
200.165.33.242 - - [18/Jun/2006:20:33:19 -0500] "GET /cgi-bin/ikonboard.cgi HTTP/1.1" 200 6574
200.165.33.242 - - [18/Jun/2006:20:33:25 -0500] "GET /cgi-bin/ikonboard.cgi HTTP/1.1" 200 34
200.165.33.242 - - [18/Jun/2006:20:34:00 -0500] "GET /cgi-bin/ikonboard.cgi HTTP/1.1" 200 34
200.165.33.242 - - [18/Jun/2006:20:34:16 -0500] "GET /cgi-bin/ikonboard.cgi HTTP/1.1" 200 34
200.165.33.242 - - [18/Jun/2006:20:34:32 -0500] "GET /cgi-bin/ikonboard.cgi HTTP/1.1" 200 34
200.165.33.242 - - [18/Jun/2006:20:34:36 -0500] "GET /cgi-bin/ikonboard.cgi HTTP/1.1" 200 56
www/cgi-bin/
bindz : Backdoor.Trojan
php : replacement script for PHP executable
sn : unknown script/executable
sitevars : help script
www/
new.cmd : Infostealer.Bancos
They were able to do this because the web process was running elevated and had permission to write over itself. Something more common in 2005 than in 2016, thankfully.
200.165.33.242 - - [18/Jun/2006:19:16:50 -0500] "GET /cgi-bin/ikonboard.cgi HTTP/1.1" 200 51
200.165.33.242 - - [18/Jun/2006:20:32:28 -0500] "GET /cgi-bin/ikonboard.cgi HTTP/1.1" 200 62
200.165.33.242 - - [18/Jun/2006:20:32:34 -0500] "GET /cgi-bin/ikonboard.cgi HTTP/1.1" 200 6568
200.165.33.242 - - [18/Jun/2006:20:33:04 -0500] "GET /cgi-bin/ikonboard.cgi HTTP/1.1" 200 34
200.165.33.242 - - [18/Jun/2006:20:33:08 -0500] "GET /cgi-bin/ikonboard.cgi HTTP/1.1" 200 6564
200.165.33.242 - - [18/Jun/2006:20:33:14 -0500] "GET /cgi-bin/ikonboard.cgi HTTP/1.1" 200 34
200.165.33.242 - - [18/Jun/2006:20:33:19 -0500] "GET /cgi-bin/ikonboard.cgi HTTP/1.1" 200 6574
200.165.33.242 - - [18/Jun/2006:20:33:25 -0500] "GET /cgi-bin/ikonboard.cgi HTTP/1.1" 200 34
200.165.33.242 - - [18/Jun/2006:20:34:00 -0500] "GET /cgi-bin/ikonboard.cgi HTTP/1.1" 200 34
200.165.33.242 - - [18/Jun/2006:20:34:16 -0500] "GET /cgi-bin/ikonboard.cgi HTTP/1.1" 200 34
200.165.33.242 - - [18/Jun/2006:20:34:32 -0500] "GET /cgi-bin/ikonboard.cgi HTTP/1.1" 200 34
200.165.33.242 - - [18/Jun/2006:20:34:36 -0500] "GET /cgi-bin/ikonboard.cgi HTTP/1.1" 200 56
(***) 200.165.33.242 - - [18/Jun/2006:20:34:43 -0500] "GET /cgi-bin/ikonboard.cgi HTTP/1.1" 200 34
(***) 200.165.33.242 - - [18/Jun/2006:20:34:59 -0500] "GET /cartaoUOL/ HTTP/1.1" 200 43611
200.165.33.242 - - [18/Jun/2006:20:35:24 -0500] "GET /cartaoUOL/ HTTP/1.1" 200 43611
200.165.33.242 - - [18/Jun/2006:20:35:41 -0500] "GET /cartaoUOL/ HTTP/1.1" 200 43611
200.165.33.242 - - [18/Jun/2006:20:39:47 -0500] "GET /cgi-bin/ikonboard.cgi HTTP/1.1" 200 62
200.165.33.242 - - [18/Jun/2006:20:39:55 -0500] "GET /cgi-bin/ikonboard.cgi HTTP/1.1" 200 6574
200.165.33.242 - - [18/Jun/2006:20:40:00 -0500] "GET /cgi-bin/ikonboard.cgi HTTP/1.1" 200 52
200.165.33.242 - - [18/Jun/2006:20:40:09 -0500] "GET /cgi-bin/ikonboard.cgi HTTP/1.1" 200 34
200.165.33.242 - - [18/Jun/2006:21:07:48 -0500] "GET /cgi-bin/ikonboard.cgi HTTP/1.1" 200 62
200.165.33.242 - - [18/Jun/2006:21:08:25 -0500] "GET /cartaoUOL/ HTTP/1.1" 404 133
Note the tell-tale "ikonboard" which in 2006 had all sorts of security problems. What you should immediately see in this listing is the test of "cartaoUOL" with a 404, then some CGI work, then suddenly "cartaUOL" exists. That was the start of the exploit.
** 2005-11-08-20:38:29: DCC Send Accepted from Named: [animesquest]_imyme01.rm (30622KB)
** 2005-11-08-20:38:29: Upload Connection Established
** 2005-11-08-20:38:32: Upload: Connection closed: Connection Lost
All of this was happening on:
** 2005-11-08-20:37:55: NOTICE: :Named!named@76b3cfb.3d716d1f.telesp.net.br NOTICE TK|Sasuke :DCC Chat (200.158.244.210)
(***) 200.165.33.242 - - [18/Jun/2006:20:34:59 -0500] "GET /cartaoUOL/ HTTP/1.1" 200 43611
200.165.33.242 - - [18/Jun/2006:20:35:24 -0500] "GET /cartaoUOL/ HTTP/1.1" 200 43611
200.165.33.242 - - [18/Jun/2006:20:35:41 -0500] "GET /cartaoUOL/ HTTP/1.1" 200 43611
200.165.33.242 - - [18/Jun/2006:20:39:47 -0500] "GET /cgi-bin/ikonboard.cgi HTTP/1.1" 200 62
200.165.33.242 - - [18/Jun/2006:20:39:55 -0500] "GET /cgi-bin/ikonboard.cgi HTTP/1.1" 200 6574
200.165.33.242 - - [18/Jun/2006:20:40:00 -0500] "GET /cgi-bin/ikonboard.cgi HTTP/1.1" 200 52
200.165.33.242 - - [18/Jun/2006:20:40:09 -0500] "GET /cgi-bin/ikonboard.cgi HTTP/1.1" 200 34
200.165.33.242 - - [18/Jun/2006:21:07:48 -0500] "GET /cgi-bin/ikonboard.cgi HTTP/1.1" 200 62
200.165.33.242 - - [18/Jun/2006:21:08:25 -0500] "GET /cartaoUOL/ HTTP/1.1" 404 133
Note the tell-tale "ikonboard" which in 2006 had all sorts of security problems. What you should immediately see in this listing is the test of "cartaoUOL" with a 404, then some CGI work, then suddenly "cartaUOL" exists. That was the start of the exploit.
They went on to add their IRC bot for the C&C and start exploring the file system. They defaced the web site and caused all sorts of embarrassment. Their target was an athletic association that helped kids. Way to go h4x0r! 1337 skillz with milkshakes.
200.165.33.242 - that's a Brazilian IP, naked just like a brazilian. The IRC bot called back to irc.irchighway.net and connected to the #TOKUGAWA room. There it looked like the bot was trying to upload some 30MB file:
** 2005-11-08-20:38:29: Upload Connection Established
** 2005-11-08-20:38:32: Upload: Connection closed: Connection Lost
All of this was happening on:
200.158.244.210 was also Brazil. It's Telefonica now.
The ISP hosting the site ran a scan of the virtual host and found some compromised files.
bindz : Backdoor.Trojan
php : replacement script for PHP executable
sn : unknown script/executable
sitevars : help script
www/
new.cmd : Infostealer.Bancos
They were able to do this because the web process was running elevated and had permission to write over itself. Something more common in 2005 than in 2016, thankfully.
They left their "snarf.c" and its compiled executable. Mostly these were amateur hackers who were just experimenting with a site that was very unsecured. I remember digging into their irc traffic and finding some irc logs published on the internet. That's where I learned that they were Japanese and had been using another relay "jump" node out of Uruguay. I don't have records on that anymore.
The owners of those IP addresses back in 2006:
inetnum: 201.14/16
aut-num: AS8167
abuse-c: BTA17
owner: Brasil Telecom S/A - Filial Distrito Federal
ownerid: 076.535.764/0326-90
responsible: Brasil Telecom S. A. - CNRS
address: SEPS 702/092 Cj. B - Bl B 3 andar Gen. Alencastro, S/N,
address: 70390-025 - Brasilia - DF
inetnum: 200.165/16
aut-num: AS7738
abuse-c: CGR13
owner: Telemar Norte Leste S.A.
ownerid: 002.558.134/0001-58
responsible: Marlemar Telgon
address: Rua Humberto de Campos, 425, 7ยบ andar
address: 22430-190 - Rio de Janeiro - RJ